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Abstract
European capital markets show increasing concern about the ex-
tent of sovereign debts and their sustainability. Here we explore some
insights that the Overlapping Generations (OLG) framework has to
oer on such issues. The OLG framework implies, for example, that
there is a limit to the amount of debt that may be sustained in a
closed economy | with high debt raising interest rates and crowd-
ing out capital formation. But capital market integration with less
indebted partners allows for a fall in interest rates as a result of bor-
rowing from one's neighbour. Indeed we nd that | in equilibrium
| most of the debt of a high indebted country will be transferred to
partner countries.
Rather like ECB discount policy, our formal analysis is conducted
without taking sovereign default risk properly into account, however.
We go on to discuss three possible sources of default risk | creditor
panic, exogenous interest rate shocks and \over-borrowing" | and we
emphasize the need for comparative statics to be complemented by
disequilibrium dynamics.
Key words: debt sustainability, overlapping generations, sovereign de-
fault, Euro-zone debt crisis
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In the nancial crisis of 2008/9, counter-party risk was triggered by doubts
about the value of mortgage assets | or their ospring, MBSs | held by
highly leveraged banks. The situation is now compounded by market concern
as to the extent and sustainability of debt of sovereigns.
The Overlapping Generations (OLG) framework as initially developed by
Peter Diamond (1965) for a closed economy has, we believe, some insights
to oer. As debt transfers spending power from Young to Old it decreases
the overall savings rate and crowds out physical capital. In addition, it
is well known that an unfunded pension scheme has very similar eects to
government debt in an OLG context: an unfunded pension scheme can be
represented as a direct lump-sum transfer from Young to Old.
If there was a problem of excess capital formation, debt can have the
virtue of avoiding `dynamic ineciency' where the rate of return on capital
falls below the rate of depreciation. But the same logic implies that there
is a limit to the amount of debt that can be sustained in a closed economy,
Rankin & Roa (2003). Beyond a certain point, debt will absorb so much
savings that the capital stock cannot be maintained, leading ceteris paribus
to progressive de-cumulation.
What of capital market integration, surely more relevant for European
countries? This is what we explore in this paper applying the OLG frame-
work in a multi-country context with countries that are homogeneous in all
respects except for initial conditions in terms of sovereign indebtedness. For
simplicity, we work with two countries, one so heavily indebted that the
amount of debt in issue equals the maximum sustainable in autarky; the
other debt-free. In equilibrium, after debt has spread from one to the other,
interest rates and GDP converge to common values | but national incomes
will dier as interest payments follow debt across national frontiers. Rela-
tive to a totally debt-free alternative, the presence of debt will lead to some
crowding out in the region as a whole (which may or may not be desirable
depending on the risk of dynamic ineciency) but there will be no risk of
imminent capital de-cumulation.
What is perhaps more remarkable is that, in the process, the bulk of the
debt of the highly indebted partner must be transferred to its neighbour.
That the initially debt-free neighbour winds up holding more debt is because
its national income and wealth rises thanks to the transfer payments of inter-
est it receives as integration proceeds: and conversely for its high-borrowing
2neighbour.
In short, the OLG model predicts the situation which exists at present,
where debts of the Southern Euro-member countries are widely spread among
their Northern neighbours. The model shows that giving highly indebted
Southern member countries (e.g., Greece and Portugal) access to interna-
tional capital markets by joining the Euro is a double-edged sword. On the
one hand it increases the maximum sustainable government debt in those
countries by moving them well clear of the risk of a Rankin-Roa-style col-
lapse. On the other hand it creates incentive problems: the incentive to
get debt down is much reduced, both because the risk of the economy im-
ploding is lower, and because more than half of its debt gets transferred to
North member states, so default will reverse an income transfer from South
to North.
When the liberalisation of capital markets led to a succession of crisis
in Emerging Markets, in Mexico and East Asia, for example, Europe was
seen as a haven of stability, partly because the adoption of a common money
eliminated currency risk. But the build up of cross border holdings of non-
contingent sovereign debt raises the prospect of default from several sources:
from creditor panic, for example, and from the temptation to over-borrow
in a context where the eects of crowding out are widely dissipated. These
are causes for concern | particularly in a context where current account
adjustment has to be achieved without exchange rate changes.
Our formal analysis looks only at steady states: and the dynamics con-
sidered in Diamond's original paper | and in a recent two country study
by Farmer & Zotti (2010) | assume full employment, as with exible wages
and prices extra savings leads to more investment. But in a context where
wages and prices are less exible | as they are in Europe relative to the
US, for example | there is the risk that plans to reduce debt in order to
increase saving in the long run will cause a recession in the short run (as
consumption falls before investment expands). So in practice credible plans
for deleveraging will need to take the dynamics of adjustment into account.
Another great simplication we make is to assume both economies produce
the same good: but Farmer & Zotti (2010) discuss how this assumption may
be relaxed.
The paper proceeds as follows. The formal results are developed in Sec-
tion 2 and illustrated in the next section with numerical examples using
parameter values based on those in Rankin & Roa (2003). This is followed
in Section 4 by a comparison autarchy versus integration using a graphical
3analysis based on the Diamond model. In Section 5 we discuss three factors
that might lead to default and how they may apply in the European context;
and in Section 6 we return to the important distinction between long-run
equilibrium and short-run dynamic outcomes. In conclusion, we consider
briey what this analysis might imply for checking the crisis-prone nature of
European sovereign bond markets.
2 A two-country overlapping generations model
Our model is a two-country version of Diamond's (1965) well-known overlap-
ping generations model. Consider an economy with two countries: country H
which is heavily indebted, issuing a substantial amount b of sovereign debt;
and country F which is debt-free, i.e., issues no debt. In each country, at
any given time t, these is a continuum of measure 1 of young consumers who
live for two periods. A young consumer is endowed with 1 unit of labour
and supplies it inelastically when he/she is young and nothing when he/she
is old. Each country has equal proportional young and old generations and
the size of the population (consisting of both young and old generations) in
each country at any time is assumed constant (of measure 2).
For simplicity, we assume that, in both countries, consumers share identi-
cal preferences and rms share the same constant return to scale technology.
In addition, both countries are assumed to produce the same traded good.
Let the capital markets for this two-country economy be integrated: so
capital and bonds can be traded internationally. Strictly speaking, consumers
are indierent about the composition of their assets in this world of perfect
certainty. However, it would take only an innitesimal transaction cost of
acquiring foreign assets to make them prefer to hold domestic ones, and this
is also quite a realistic assumption. Hence we shall assume a form of home
bias: so young consumers in country F would allocate their savings rst in
domestic capital and then in foreign bonds, and nally in foreign capital.
The discussion of the incentive for country F to prefer holding foreign debt
is deferred to later sections.
We assume that the government in country H uses lump-sum taxes to
nance the interest payment on the debt b and default is excluded. In the
model below, we let b to be exogenously given and constant over time. The
government in country F charges no taxes.
In what follows, we rst outline the structure of the economy for country
4H and F respectively. We then analyze the property of the steady-state
equilibrium in this two-country economy.
2.1 Heavily indebted country H
A representative young consumer in country H, born in period t, maximizes












t+1) represents the life time utility, cY
t and cO
t+1 the consumption
when he is young and old respectively,  the discount factor, and u() the
period utility satisfying u0() > 0 and u00() < 0. His budget constraints are
c
Y
t = wt   t   st; c
Y
t  0; (2)
c
O
t+1 = Rt+1st   (1   )t+1; c
O
t+1  0; (3)
where wt and st represent wages and savings when he is young,  the fraction
of taxes paid by the young generation, t and t+1 the total taxes in period t
and t + 1, and Rt+1 the gross real interest rate between periods t and t + 1.
So the allocation problem faced by the young is to nd some fcY
t ;cO
t+1g to
maximise (1) subject to (2) and (3).
The aggregate taxes at t are used to nance the interest payment on the
government debt b, i.e.,
1  t + 1  (1   )t = t = (Rt   1)b; (4)
where Rt is the real gross interest rates between period t   1 and t.
The rst order condition for the optimal consumption allocation is given








Given fwt;b;Rt;Rt+1g, (2){(5) determine fcY
t ;cO
t+1;st;tg. The consumption
of the old in period t, cO
t , is determined in a similar fashion by the young
generation born at period t   1.
Assuming perfectly competitive rms that can access a constant to return
technology represented by the production function
Y = F(K;L)
5where K, L and Y are the aggregate capital, labour and output respectively.
Let F(;) be of homogenous of degree 1 such that F(K;L) = LF(K=L;1) 
Lf(k) with f satisfying Inada conditions.1 For the size of the young gener-
ation assumed above, L = 1, the aggregate capital K is the same as the per
labour capital k (scaled by the size of the young generation). So K and k
will be used interchangeably below.
A representative rm maximizes its per period prots as in
F(K;L)   ^ RK   wL; (6)
by choosing some fK;Lg subject to given rental cost of capital ^ R and the
wage rates w.
Given the property of F, the two rst order conditions for (6) are
f
0(k) = ^ R; (7)
f(k)   kf
0(k) = w: (8)
Note that (7) and (8) specify aggregate demand for capital and labour. Given
inelastic labour supply of L = 1, (8) species the wage rates.
Let the depreciation rate of capital be . No arbitrage between renting
capital and buying bonds (from t to t + 1) implies
Rt+1 = ^ Rt+1   : (9)
So for given Rt+1, (7) and (9) determine the aggregate capital Kt+1, and (8)
determines the wages, wt.
We now turn to capital accumulation and the division of the output. Note
that the gross aggregate investment in period t is Kt+1   Kt + Kt, and the
aggregate consumption, given the size of either generation is of measure 1, is
Ct  CY
t + CO
t  1  cY
t + 1  cO
t . The division of the aggregate output is as
follows
Yt = F(Kt;Lt = 1) = Ct + Kt+1   Kt + Kt + (Rt   1)bt();
i.e., output is divided between aggregate consumption, investment and the
interest payment on the fraction of the debt held by country F, (Rt 1)bt().





t + kt+1   kt + kt + (Rt   1)bt(): (10)
1Here we assume there is no productivity growth.
6Finally, the clearing condition for domestic capital markets is given by
st = kt+1 + b   bt+1(); (11)
where bt+1() is the foreign holding of the debt issued by country H. Since
the real interest rates are determined by the integrated capital markets, (11)
determines the allocation of the debt between the two countries.
2.2 Debt-free country F
The young generation in country F faces a similar problem as specied in
(1){(3), except that no lump-sum taxes are levied. By setting  = 0, one can
obtain respective consumption and savings fcY
t ();cO
t+1();st()g, where ()
indicates variables in country F.
A representative rm in country F faces the same problem as that in
country H. So demand for capital and the wages are the same as in (7) and
(8).
The allocation of domestically produced output in country F is as follows
f(kt()) = c
Y
t () + c
O
t () + kt+1()   kt() + kt()   (Rt()   1)bt(): (12)
Note that (Rt()   1)bt() represents the transfer from country H.
The equilibrium condition for the domestic capital markets in country F
is given by
st() = kt+1() + bt+1(): (13)
2.3 The equilibrium
Here we rst outline the procedure for obtaining full employment dynamics
in such a neoclassical model. We then move on to study the properties of
steady state equilibrium.
As capital markets in these two countries are integrated, the extra clearing
condition required is the equalisation of real interest rates in both countries,
Rt = Rt(); 8t: (14)
Given (14), (7) for country H and its equivalent for country F imply
kt = kt(); 8t: (15)
7Both (15) and (8) imply that wages are equalised across the two countries
and they only depend on kt,
wt = wt()  wt(kt): (16)












st = st(kt;Rt;Rt+1); (19)
and similarly for country F.
Summing (10) and (12), and (11) and (13) respectively yield
f(kt) = [c
Y
t (kt;Rt;Rt+1) + c
O





t (kt 1;Rt 1;Rt;)]=2 + kt+1   kt + kt; (20)
2kt+1 + b = st(kt;Rt;Rt+1) + st(kt;Rt;Rt+1;): (21)
The above equations jointly determine the dynamics of fkt;Rtg1
0 for some
given initial conditions.
Equation (17){(19) are then used to back out consumption and savings
for country H (and their counterparts for country F). Finally, (11) or (13)
can be used to trace the sequence of foreign holding of the debt, bt().
We now turn to analysing the steady state. To make things simple, we
assume  = 0, u(c) = ln(c) and f(k) = k where 0 <  < 1. The steady
state equilibrium for k and R can be obtained by imposing kt+1 = kt;8t
and Rt+1 = Rt;8t, and nd the xed point in (20) and (21). Then, other
quantities can be backed out using the procedure outlined above. As pointed
out in Rankin & Roa (2003) that there is an upper limit in b above which
capital stock converges to zero, we assume b is always below that limit. The
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 With no capital depreciation, log utility and Cobb-Douglas
production function, the steady state capital stock for both countries is the
larger root of
2[(1   )k 1   (1 + )k]
1 +  + (1   )k 1   k 1=(1 + k 1)
= b: (22)
8The real gross interest rates and the wages for both countries are given by
R = 1 + k
 1; (23)
w = (1   )k
: (24)
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Proof: See Appendix A.
The outcomes outlined in the proposition above are highly non-linear in
k. The detailed comparative static analysis is done numerically in the next
section when country H chooses its maximum autarky level of debt. Here we
present some selected comparative static results: rst some properties of the
equilibrium capital in the steady state and then the properties of the fraction
of the debt held by non-debt-issuing country.
Proposition 2 In the steady state equilibrium:
9i Increasing b reduces the steady state capital stock k.
ii Increasing the discount factor  raises the steady state capital.
iii Increasing, , the fraction of taxes levied on the young generation in
country H reduces the common steady state level of capital.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note that properties in Proposition 2 resemble those in a closed economy
and they are quite intuitive. Take, for example, Proposition 2(ii). An increase
in  makes young generations in both countries value more consumption when
they are old and so raises their savings. This depresses the real interest rate
and results in an increase in the equilibrium capital stock.
Proposition 3 The fraction of the debt held by country F is strictly greater
than a half when  is large and strictly less than half when  is small.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The detailed discussion of the property in Proposition 3 is deferred to
Section 4.
3 Comparative statics of the steady state equi-
librium: numerical results
To gauge the quantitative signicance of changes of parameters on the out-
comes in the steady state equilibrium, we use numerical simulations. As a
baseline case, we set parameters to be  = 1,  = 1=3,  = 1 and b the
maximum level of debt in a closed economy. We report the fraction of debt
held by the foreign country, the equilibrium prices, the allocation of GNP
for both countries and asset holding for both countries. We then vary the
parameter values of  to 1/2 and 2,  to 0.4,  to 1/2 and 0, to see the
robustness of the results.
Table 1 reports results allocation of output, the holdings of assets in both
countries. We also report prices, total debt and the share of the holding
from country F for comparison. Tables 2 and 3 presents the results when 
changes. It is evident that varying the discount factor  has negligible eect
on the foreign fraction of the debt holding.
10Table 1: Debt holdings, prices, consumption and asset allocations in a
two-country model: the baseline.a
Allocation of GNP Asset holding
CY CO GNP (R   1)bF s k Debt
Home 0.157 0.342 0.500 -0.032 0.157 0.150 0.007
Foreign 0.177 0.386 0.563 0.032 0.177 0.150 0.027
Prices w=0.354 R =2.180
Total debt 0.034
Foreign Fraction 0.796
a We use  = 1,  = 1=3,  = 1 and b the maximum level of debt in a closed
economy.
Table 2: Debt holdings, prices, consumption and asset allocations in a
two-country model: changing .a
Allocation of GNP Asset holding
CY CO GNP (R   1)bF s k Debt
Home 0.171 0.237 0.408 -0.026 0.086 0.082 0.004
Foreign 0.193 0.267 0.460 0.026 0.096 0.082 0.015
Prices w=0.266 R =3.095
Total debt 0.019
Foreign Fraction 0.795
a We use  = 1=2,  = 1=3,  = 1 and b the maximum level of debt in a closed
economy.
Table 4 reports results when the capital share of output, , is increased
from 1/3 to 0.4. Comparing with the baseline case, increasing the capital
share raises the fraction of the debt held by country F signicantly.
Tables 5 and 6 present results when, , the share of taxes levied on the
young generation in country H is progressively reduced. Notice that the
fraction of the debt held by the foreign country is larger than half in the
previous ve cases. It only drops below half when the old generation in
country H is heavily taxed. This conrms our results in Proposition 3.
11Table 3: Debt holdings, prices, consumption and asset allocations in a
two-country model: changing .a
Allocation of GNP Asset holding
CY CO GNP (R   1)bF s k Debt
Home 0.121 0.456 0.577 -0.037 0.242 0.231 0.011
Foreign 0.136 0.514 0.651 0.037 0.273 0.231 0.042
Prices w=0.409 R =1.885
Total debt 0.052
Foreign Fraction 0.795
a We use  = 2,  = 1=3,  = 1 and b the maximum level of debt in a closed
economy.
Table 4: Debt holdings, prices, consumption and asset allocations in a
two-country model: changing .a
Allocation of GNP Asset holding
CY CO GNP (R   1)bF s k Debt
Home 0.108 0.274 0.383 -0.025 0.108 0.106 0.002
Foreign 0.122 0.310 0.432 0.025 0.122 0.106 0.016
Prices w=0.245 R =2.538
Total debt 0.018
Foreign Fraction 0.884
a We use  = 1,  = 0:4,  = 1 and b the maximum level of debt in a closed
economy.
4 Capital market integration | an applica-
tion
Alan Greenspan (2011) argues that, in the European Union, there is a useful
distinction to be drawn between the economies of North and South in terms
of sovereign spreads:
The [debt] burden is primarily on southern Europe, where sovereign
bond credit spreads (relative to the German Bund) range from
370 basis points (Italy) to 1,960 basis points (Greece). The north-
ern eurozone countries have tight spreads against Germany | a
12Table 5: Debt holdings, prices, consumption and asset allocations in a
two-country model: changing .a
Allocation of GNP Asset holding
CY CO GNP (R   1)bF s k Debt
Home 0.153 0.337 0.490 -0.036 0.167 0.145 0.021
Foreign 0.175 0.387 0.562 0.036 0.175 0.145 0.030
Prices w=0.351 R =2.206
Total debt 0.051
Foreign Fraction 0.582
a We use  = 1,  = 1=3,  = 1=2 and b the maximum level of debt in a closed
economy.
Table 6: Debt holdings, prices, consumption and asset allocations in a
two-country model: changing .a
Allocation of GNP Asset holding
CY CO GNP (R   1)bF s k Debt
Home 0.131 0.308 0.439 -0.058 0.200 0.123 0.077
Foreign 0.166 0.389 0.555 0.058 0.166 0.123 0.043
Prices w=0.331 R =2.350
Total debt 0.120
Foreign Fraction 0.356
a We use  = 1,  = 1=3,  = 0 and b the maximum level of debt in a closed
economy.
narrow 40 to 80 basis points for the Netherlands, Austria, Fin-
land and France. There are thus two distinctly dened eurozone
areas: in the north and in the south. (FT 7Oct 2011).
Here we consider the impact of capital market integration in the case where
the two economies are identical but dier in one respect only | the amount of
sovereign debt in issue. Let F denote the economy free of all sovereign debt;
and H the Heavily indebted economy where the extent of debt | nanced
entirely by lump sum taxes on the young | is at its autarky maximum.
Before looking at the eects of integration, consider the autarchy equilib-
ria. Without any debt, equilibrium will be as in Figure 1, where the Young
13consume a xed fraction of the wage bill, as indicated by the label cY. The
rest of the wage bill | savings | is consumed by the Old along with the
accumulated interest, components shown separately in the gure as ^ k and
(R 1)^ k respectively, where the rate of interest corresponds to the marginal
product of capital and, in the absence of debt, the accumulated interest cor-








s = (1-β)w 
c
Y
Figure 1: Division of output between young and old | the debt free case.
In the economy with sovereign debt, the Young are subject to a tax on
their wages,  = (R 1)b, so their consumption as a fraction of GDP will fall,
as indicated in Figure 2. The share of output going to the Old increases as |
along with the prots of enterprise | they now enjoy the transfer payment
of interest. The wealth which they use to fund consumption has increased
to include the stock of debt as well as the stock of capital, as indicated by
the components shown separately in the gure as ^ k + b and (R   1)(^ k + b)
respectively, where (R   1)b denotes the transfer of interest.
The negative eect of debt on the equilibrium level of capital is shown
in Figure 3. With debt, the equilibrium condition changes from s = k to
s = k + b, but savings has been reduced, so the level of capital falls. That
debt is at a maximum is shown by the tangency of the savings function with
the line labelled k + b.
With capital market integration debt is redistributed in between the two
economies so as to equalise the interest rate paid. Since this corresponds













Figure 2: Division of output between young and old | the high debt case.
to the marginal product of capital, the eect is to ensure a common level
of capital and GDP, as indicated by the point labelled I in the gure |
corresponding to equilibrium in a closed economy with a debt level of b=2.
Though production is equalised, national incomes will dier as some of the
debt interest is transferred from Young in country H to the older generation in
country F. How much? The striking result obtained reported in the previous
section for economies where the young bear the taxes is that more than half
of the debt and debt interest are transferred.
To see how this arises, consider rst the condition for equilibrium in
the integrated market. As it happens, this mirrors equilibrium in a closed
economy with debt of b=2, with the capital stock determined as:
1
1 + 
[w(k)   (R(k)   1)b=2] = k + b=2
with the wage and the rate of return determined by production conditions.
Combining this with the savings and asset accumulation equation for
either of the countries one can solve for  the share of b held by the outside
its country of origin. For the partner country this is:
1
1 + 
w(k) = k + b
15y







Figure 3: Autarchy equilibria and the eect of capital market Integration













The implication for savings and for national national income in the hereto-
fore debt-free economy are illustrated in Figure 4, where ^ k, the equilibrium
capital stock after integration, is smaller than under autarchy and the excess
of savings above this level, i.e. w(^ k)=(1 + )   ^ k indicates the holdings of
foreign debt. The interest paid to the older generation on this is [R(^ k) 1]b,
and it enables the old to consume more without reducing the consumption
of the young, as is shown in the gure. With transfer, national income now
exceeds national production.
It is clear that economy F will hold more of the sovereign debt issued
by H than H itself when  = 1, i.e., the young in country H bear all the
(interest) tax burden. But the simulations show, see Table 6, that this is no
longer true when  = 0 and the (interest) tax burden falls entirely on the
old. The eect of raising  on the savings function in H is to shift upwards
the dotted line in 3, so when  = 0, it will lie above the solid line showing
savings in F. For some threshold value of , the two will coincide, and the
logic used above indicates that sovereign debt will be equally shared at this













Figure 4: The income transfer to the erstwhile debt free economy.
threshold. Our simulations suggest, however, the relevant threshold value of
 would require taxes to fall mostly on the old | Table 5 shows that for
 = 1=2,  > 1=2. We conclude that the result that  > 1=2 is robust to all
reasonable parameter variations.
5 Introducing default risk: creditor panic, in-
terest rate shocks, and over-borrowing
One of the equilibrium eects of capital market integration predicted by
our simple OLG model is that a country whose sovereign government is
predisposed to issue debt will end up exporting the bulk of this debt to its
neighbours. Why should this matter? The answer involves two key elements
not yet considered: namely the prospect of default and the dynamics of
adjustment. On the former, there is, of course, an extensive literature on
the nature of equilibrium with substantial cross-border holdings of sovereign
debt | and the challenges it faces. Here we briey highlight three factors
that might lead to default: creditor panic, exogenous shocks to borrowing
costs, and debtor myopia.
175.1 Sudden stops and self fullling crisis
Some observers, notably Calvo (1988), have warned of the risk that market
forces may create self-fullling debt crises, with sharp rises in borrowing costs
making default incentive-compatible even when there no solvency issues in
the rst place. Events in Mexico in 1994-5 were interpreted in this way by
Cole & Kehoe (1996); and Radelet & Sachs (2000) analysed the 1997-8 crisis
in South East Asia in similar terms.
As explained by Cohen and Portes (2004, p.11):
The intuition is quite simple: perception of high risk raises the
spread, which in turn raises the debt service burden, which in turn
provokes the crisis. Beliefs are self-fullling because the funda-
mentals themselves are partly endogenous. If default reduces the
amount that a country pays to its creditors below what it would
normally pay then lenders perceptions do change how much a
country will eventually pay.
As mechanisms to avoid such self-fullling debt crises, Cohen and Portes
discuss debt workouts and the IMF acting as Lender of First Resort.
5.2 Exogenous shocks to non-contingent debt
If it is creditors who call the shots on the cost of debt nance, exogenous
shocks to interest rates can trigger default by making debt too expensive
to service | assuming continued servicing of sovereign debt held abroad
is `incentive compatible' only if the country is better o honouring the debt
than by defaulting. In Guimar~ aes (2011), for example, where default involves
a cost equivalent to about 1 percent of GDP in perpetuity and debt costs 2%
per annum in real terms to service, debt levels above 50% of GDP are judged
not to be incentive compatible . In fact, Guimar~ aes argues that about half the
write-down of Latin American debt under the Brady plan can be explained
along these lines. The hike to US interest rates by Paul Volcker designed
to check US ination had the unintended side-eect of making full servicing
dollar-denominated sovereign debt in Latin America no longer worth the
candle.
In a similar vein | but a very dierent context | Ozkan and Sutherland,
in their study of the 1992 nancial crisis in Europe, argue that continued
18UK membership of the European monetary system was no longer incentive-
compatible when German interest rates were raised sharply to oset the
inationary pressures of German unication.
5.3 Myopic Governments
What about debtor behaviour? As Rochet (2006) argues, there may be
incentive issues in the debtor country that lead to over-borrowing and default
risk even when costs are sucient to rule out strategic default. Inability to
pay may arise from myopia on the part of a government which borrows as
much as it can against a stochastic stream of tax and nds it has insucient
funds to service the debt when tax receipts fail to grow. Lenders, being aware
of this, will impose a default premium on interest charges so debt will follow a
`rational bubble', characterized by periods of steady (and procyclical) capital
inows, ending in crisis periods where the country defaults and investors stop
lending for a time', Rochet (2006, pp. 15-16 ).
5.4 The European context
Since the crisis of 2008/9, the exogenous interest rate shocks for Euro debtors
have been negative rather than positive as the ECB, in common with the Fed
and the Bank of England, has lowered borrowing rates to practically zero.
But this has to be seen in the context of severe and continuing nancial crisis
| in which several countries have been forced to socialise bank debts in order
to avoid the collapse of their banking systems. Although banking diculties
were at rst associated with holdings of sub-prime mortgages, they are now
linked with holdings of the debt of the sovereigns themselves, the debt of
Southern members of the Euro in particular | where higher than average
ination has led to uncompetitive exchange rates.
While overvalued currencies may be the principal driver, the exposure of
these Southern sovereigns surely involves the other two factors listed above.
Greece, for example, widely criticised for scal laxity, seems to correspond to
the case of sovereign over-borrowing, with debts growing at an unsustainable
rate as a prelude to default. Well before the current crisis, in fact, Buiter &
Sibert (2005) pointed out that the discounting practices of the ECB had the
eect of subsidising high risk borrowers by lending at triple A rates; and |
by suppressing market signals | this may have provided incentives for loose
scal policy. Alan Greenspan (2011), it appears, also endorses this view:
19Subsidised borrowing may have accounted for much of the accel-
eration in the ratio of euro-south consumption relative to that of
Germany. It rose between 1995 and 1998 at a 1.26 percent an-
nual rate. Presumably as a consequence of subsidised euro credit,
that ratio accelerated to a 1.63 per cent annual rate of increase
between 1998 and 2007. (FT Oct 7).
On the other hand, the risk of contagion to other Southern members | and
beyond | seems more like creditor panic, driven perhaps by the perceived
payos to speculative betting as in East Asia where one country after another
on a dollar peg was subject to speculative attack2. Hence the calls for the `big
bazooka' of massive short-term support to restore condence in the survival
of the Eurozone.
6 Dynamics: the short run versus the long
run
At least as important as default is the need to consider the dynamics of
adjustment. Farmer & Zotti (2010) have studied issues of stability and debt
limits in a two country OLG setting; but this is under the assumption of full
employment, where increases in saving are assumed to lead automatically to
an increase in investment.
Dropping the convenient assumption of Say's Law leads to a more Keyne-
sian perspective, where income in the short run is determined by aggregate
demand. To these capture aggregate demand eects, we need to depart from
Diamond's assumption of fully exible prices and replace it by the more
Keynesian assumption of price and wage rigidities. An example of such a
modication to the Diamond model is Rankin (1987).
In fact, the OLG framework, with its sharp distinction between Old and
Young in terms of their marginal propensities to consume, lends itself natu-
rally to such a treatment. Take for example the implications for consumer
demand of shifting tax from the Young to the Old. Because the Old have an
higher marginal propensity to consume (unity) this will increase savings and
increase the capital stock in the long run full employment equilibrium. But
2Typically successful, except for Hong Kong which beat the speculators at their own
game, see Miller & Zhang (2000) and Goodhart & Lu (2003).
20in the short run consumer demand will fall and, in the absence of a rise in
investment demand, there is a risk of recession.3
Reducing the level of sovereign debt itself could likewise have negative
demand eects until such time as investment increases to oset the decline
in consumer demand predicted by an OLG approach. How long | and how
profound | these short term eects might be is an open question. The
dierence of focus | on long run versus short | may indeed lie at the heart
of the debate on whether scal contraction is the right medicine for European
countries at this time.
7 Conclusion: Europe without the heel of
Achilles?
The analytical results on the redistribution of sovereign debt in an integrated
market have been derived in setting that is deliberately stylised and simpli-
ed. We postulate large initial dierences in debt in countries otherwise
identical, for example; and there is no explicit account of incentives and dy-
namics in the formal model. (Nor is any account taken of capital depreciation
in simulations.)
The consequence is clear results; but in a setting where debt appears for
no obvious reason and it's redistribution is attended with potentially large
problems. Here in conclusion we take the opportunity to sketch how adding
elements missing from the formal analysis might oer a more balanced and
realistic picture.
To start with, it is worth recalling that in Peter Diamond's (1965) classic
paper debt had the attraction of avoiding 'dynamic ineciency': if saving
is conned to physical assets, capital accumulation could take society be-
yond the point of maximum sustainable consumption | beyond the Golden
Rule. By omitting depreciation for analytical simplicity, however, the risk
3We may write the level of consumer demand
y(lt) = (wlt   ) + (1 + r)(st 1   (1   ))
So
y(lt) = wlt + (   (1 + rt   )) + (1 + rt)st 1
So assuming w and r constant, aggregate consumer demand will fall as  decreases, with
multiplier eects if the fall in demand reduces employment income.
21of dynamic ineciency has been ruled out: as can be seen from the gures,
consumption is always increasing in capital. It would not be dicult, how-
ever, to include depreciation in such a manner that the maximum rate of
consumption lay between the two autarchy positions; so the highly indebted
economy would in isolation be saving too little and the debt free economy too
much. Capital market integration would oer welfare gains to both parties
in this case.
Despite such gains, it has to be acknowledged that | given the initial
conditions as specied | the nancial exposure of the highly indebted econ-
omy remains a potential heel of Achilles for the integrated market. Note,
however, that the benets of debt would remain | without the risks of
cross-border exposure | if both countries were to issue roughly the same
amount of debt. One is tempted to ask: Is there any way of getting to such
an outcome starting from the heterogeneous initial conditions we postulate?
One way would be for the heavily indebted country to reduce its debts
| possibly by default | in combination with debt-nanced decits by its
erstwhile debt free neighbour. This may sound a fanciful and articial way
of changing the initial conditions: but it seems to be the direction in which
Europe is heading. There is considerable pressure on Southern countries to
rein in their decits - with Greece expected to write down its sovereign debt
by about 50% ; and Northern countries are being encouraged to spend more
to avoid the recession that will otherwise be associated with such deleveraging
by Southern neighbours.
To prevent a recurrence of capital market crisis, it will be necessary to
prevent returning to the original initial conditions. This means facing up
to the incentive issues agged up by Buiter & Sibert (2005); and as Rochet
(2006) suggests it could well involve institutional rules imposed by suprana-
tional bodies. This is presumably what those who want to rewrite the Treaty
of Europe have in mind.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
From (14) to (16), real interest rates, wage rates and capital stock for both
countries are identical. Given the staedy state k exists, (7){(9) imply (23)
and (24) since  = 0.











[w      (1   )=R]; (A.2)
s =
R(w   ) + (1   )
1 + 
: (A.3)
Substitution of (4), (23) and (24) into (A.1){(A.3) yields (25){(27).
















Substitution of (23) and (24) into (A.4){(A.6) yields (28){(30).
To obtain the fraction of the debt held by country F, we use (13) when k
is at the steady state. Substitution of (30) into (13) leads to (31).
Finally, to obtain the xed point equation for the steady state k, we rst
impose stationary conditions to kt and Rt in (21). We then replace all savings
functions in (21) by (27) and (30) to obtain the xed point equation (22).
24The reason to choose the larger root is because that root corresponds to the
stable steady state (see Rankin and Roa, 2003). QED
B Proof of Proposition 2
Rewrite the xed point equation (22). Imposing stationarity in (21) and
replacing the two savings function by (27) and (30) yield





= 2k + b: (B.1)
Rearranging to obtain
g(k;;;) 





  2k = b: (B.2)
Note that g(k;;;) is the same as the left hand side of (22).
As has been shown in Rankin & Roa (2003), function g(k;;;) is
increasing when k is small and decreasing when k is large. It has a maximum
at some ~ k > 0 such that g(~ k;;;) > 0. As long as b  g(~ k;), the larger
root to (B.2) exists. As the xed point is the intersection between b and the
decreasing part of g(k;), increasing b results in an decrease in the xed point
k.





(1 + )2f[w      (1   )=R] + wg: (B.3)
The rst term inside the bracket of the right hand side of (B.3) is the life time
wealth of the young generation in country H. So w   (1 )=R  0 and
@g=@ > 0. This implies that the decreasing part of the function g(k;;)
shifts upwards; intersecting a constant b results in an increase in xed point
solution k.







Using the similar argument as that for , the xed point solution k decreases.
QED
25C Proof of Proposition 3











(1   )(R   1)b
(1 + )R
= k + b=2: (C.1)
Let b() = b, substitution of (A.6) into (13) in the steady state yields
w
1 + 
= k + b: (C.2)

























So country F will hold more than half of the debt when  is large (when the
young generation in country H is taxed heavily) and less than half of the debt
when  is small (when the old generation in country H is taxed heavily).
The threshold of  above which country F will hold more than half of the
debt is given by
~  = 1=(R(~ )   1):
QED
26